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"OTHER ACTS" EVIDENCE 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of Law 
Case Western Reserve University 
Ohio Evidence Rule 404(8), which is identical to 
Federal Rule 404(b), governs the admissibility of evi-
dence of "other acts." It reads: "Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in order to show that he 
acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." 
The admission of "other acts" as evidence in crim-
inal cases is commonplace. Unfortunately, the er-
roneous admission of "other acts" is also com-
monplace. One commentator has written that "un-
charged misconduct is perhaps the most 
misunderstood area of evidence law." E. lm-
winkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence viii 
(1984). In his survey of the cases on this issue, Dean 
Wigmore found "bewildering variances of rulings in 
the different jurisdictions and even in the same 
jurisdiction .... " 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 302, at 246 
(Chadbourn rev. 1979). This state of confusion is also 
found in the Ohio cases. Prior to the adoption of the 
Ohio rule, evidence of "other acts" was governed by 
RC 2945.59, the so-called "Similar Acts" statute. In a 
1975 article, two authors-one a prosecutor and the 
other a defense counsel-commented on that 
statute: "The statute has been a source of major con-
fusion to attorneys and judges alike-even the title 
itself being subject to some inherent misunderstan-
ding." Herbert & Mount, Ohio's "Similar Acts 
Statute": Its Uses and Abuses, 9 Akron L. Rev. 301 
(1975). 
Although the adoption of the Federal Rules offered 
an opportunity to clarify the law in this area, the 
drafters did not take advantage of that opportunity. 
Rule 404(b) did not clarify the law; instead, it codified 
the existing confusion. The fact that Federal Rule 
404(b) is the most litigated of all the Federal Rules of 
Evidence indicates as much. See 2 J. Weinstein & M. 
Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 404-47 (1982) ("more 
decisions than occasioned by any other single rule"). 
Professors Wright and Graham accurately describe 
the effect of the rule in their treatise. They wrote: 
"Rule 404(b) is a good illustration of Wigmore's Rule 
of Codification: the 'always conceded principle 
should frequently be found solemnly enacted, while 
the important controversies ... are ignored and left 
without solution.'" 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, 
Federal Practice and Procedure 427 (1978). 
This article examines Rule 404(8). Since, however, 
Rule 404(8) cannot be understood without an appre-
ciation of Rule 404(A), which governs the admissibil-
ity of character evidence, the latter rule is discussed 
first. 
CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
Rule 404(A) governs character evidence, which is 
also known as propensity or disposition evidence. 
The first part of the rule provides: "Evidence of a per-
son's character or a trait of his character is not 
admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted 
in conformity therewith on a particular occasion .... " 
This provision concerns only the circumstantial use 
of character. It involves an inference that someone 
with a particular character trait will act in conformity 
with that trait on a particular occasion. For example, 
it could be inferred that a person with a larcenous 
character acts in conformity with that character and 
steals. Consequently, when charged with a theft of-
fense, that person's character is circumstantially 
probative. 
The circumstantial use of character, then, is not 
prohibited because it has no probative value. As 
Justice Jackson wrote: "The inquiry is not rejected 
because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is 
said to weigh too much with the jury and to so over-
persuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general 
record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend 
against a particular charge." Michelson v. U.S., 335 
U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948). For example, a three-time 
rapist is a good suspect in a rape case; nevertheless, 
such evidence is inadmissible at trial. It is excluded 
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because the accused should be convicted for what 
he did, not for what he is. The Ohio Supreme Court 
has identified the following dangers associated with 
character evidence: 
(1) The overstrong tendency to believe the defendant 
guilty of the charge merely because he is a person likely 
to do such acts; (2) the tendency to condemn not be-
cause he is believed guilty of the present charge but be-
cause he had escaped punishment from other offenses· 
(3) the injustice of attacking one who is not prepared to' 
demonstra~e the !3-ttacking evidence is fabricated; and (4) 
the confus1on of Issues which might result from bringing 
in evidence of other crimes. State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 
66, 68, 330 N.E.2d 720, 723 (1975). 
Despite these dangers, both the common law and 
Rule 404(A) recognize several exceptions .to the gen-
eral prohibition against the admissibility of character 
evidence. Rule 404(A) contains three exceptions: (1) 
the character of the accused, (2) the character of the 
victim, and (3) the character of witnesses. 
Exception: Character of Accused 
Rule 404(A)(1) provides: "Evidence of a pertinent 
trait of hi_s character offered by an accused, or by the 
prosecution to rebut the same is admissible; how-
ever, in prosecutions for rape, gross sexual imposi-
tion, and prostitution, the exceptions provided by the 
statute enacted by the General AEsembly are appli-
cable." This provision, which generally codifies the 
common law rule, has caused few problems. Never-
theless, two issues are worth noting. 
First, the exception permits only evidence of a 
"pertinent character trait." In an assault case, nonvi-
olent character is the pertinent trait. In a theft case 
honest character is the pertinent trait. The rule ap- ' 
peared to preclude the admissibility of general char-
acter traits, such as law-abiding character. Several 
cases, however, have held otherwise. U.S. v. Angelini, 
678 F.2d 380, 382 (1st Cir. 1982) (character evidence 
that a defendant is a law-abiding person is admis-
sible as a pertinent character trait); U.S. v. Hewitt, 
634 F.2d277, 280 (5th Cir. 1981) (character evidence 
that defendant was a law-abiding citizen is admis-
sible). These cases do not necessarily favor the de-
fense. The prosecution's response, either on cross-
examination or through rebuttal witnesses, to the de-
fendant's character evidence is restricted to the 
character trait offered by the defense. If the defense 
offers evidence of honest character, the prosecution 
may not respond with evidence of violent character. 
If, however, the defense offers evidence of law-
abiding character, the prosecution may respond with 
evidence of general criminal character. Such 
evidence is relevant because it responds to the 
defendant's evidence. 
Second, the term "accused" appears in the excep-
tion. This would seem to limit the exception to a 
criminal defendant. Thus, the exception would not 
apply in civil cases. There are a few cases however 
that have held otherwise. Carson v. Polley: 689 F.2d' 
562, 575 (5th Cir. 1982) (in a civil case, when the 
nature of the central issue is close to one of a crimi-
nal nature, character traits are admissible and Rule 
404(a) applies); Crumpton v. Confederation Life Ins., 
2 
672 F.2d 1248, 1253 (5th Cir. 1982). 
Methods of Proving Character 
The exceptions in Rule 404(A) specify only when 
character evidence may be admitted. That rule does 
not specify the methods of proving character. Rule 
405(A) governs the methods of proof. It reads: "Repu-
tation or Opinion. In all cases in which evidence of 
character or a trait of character of a person is admis-
s_ible, proof m~y be n:ade by testimony as to reputa-
tion or by test1mony 1n the form of an opinion. On 
cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant 
specific instances of conduct." Thus, a character 
witness may testify about his personal opinion of the 
defendant's character in addition to the defendant's 
reputation in the community. This rule represents a 
change in the common law, which permitted the use 
of reputation, but not opinion, evidence to prove 
character. 
What is not so obvious is that this change may al-
so permit expert opinion testimony concerning a de-
fendant's character. The Advisory Committee's Note 
to :e~eral Rule 405 refers to the "opinion of the psy-
chlatnst based upon examination and testing." The 
courts, however, are divided over the admissibility of 
this type of evidence. In U.S. v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 
224, 227-28 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 426 
(1983), the court held that it was not an abuse of dis-
c~etion to exclude character testimony by a psychia-
tnst that the defendant possessed a personality con-
figuration inconsistent with the outrageous and 
senseless murders of his family for which he was 
charged. In contrast, the court in U.S. v. Staggs, 553 
F.2d 1073, 1075-76 (7th Cir. 1977), held that a psychol-
ogist's testimony concerning the nonaggressive 
character of the defendant should have been admit-
ted. 
In addition to introducing its own character wit-
nesse_s to rebut defense character evidence, the pro-
secution may cross-examine defense character wit-
nesses. The theory for permitting this type of cross-
examination is that the prosecution has the right to 
test the basis for the character witness' testimony. 
For example, a defense character witness who is 
unaware of a defendant's prior arrests and convic-
tions would not appear to be very informed about the 
defendant's reputation. If that person is informed but 
ignores such information, the jury may question the 
standards used in arriving at the conclusion that the 
accused has a good reputation. In Michelson Justice 
Jackson gave the following example: 
A classic example in the books is a character witness in 
a trial for murder. She testified she grew up with the de-
fend~nt, knew his reputation for peace and quiet, and 
that 1t was good. On cross-examination she was asked if 
she had heard that the defendant had shot anybody and 
if so, how many. She answered, "three or four," and gav~ 
the names of two but could not recall the names of the 
others. She still insisted, however, that he was of "good 
character." The jury seems to have valued her informa-
tion more highly than her judgment [and convicted]. Mi-
chelson v. U.S., 335 U.S. 469,479 n.16 (1948). 
Although this form of cross-examination is permit-
ted, it is fraught with the danger of prejudice. Conse-
quently, the courts have placed limitations on its 
use. For example, in U.S. v. Glass, 709 F.2d 669, 673 
(11th Cir. 1983), the court held that the prosecution 
may inquire into specific instances of the defen-
r.4ft, dant's conduct on cross-examination only if (1) there 
~.tt, is a good faith factual basis for the question and (2) 
the incidents inquired about are relevant to the 
character traits involved at trial. See also U.S. v. 
Reed, 700 F.2d 638, 644-45 (11th Cir. 1983) (embezzle-
ment defendant, who presents character witnesses 
on the issue of his truth and veracity, may not be 
cross-examined about possession of marijuana). 
One commentator has proposed the following pro-
cedure: "As a precondition to cross-examination 
about other wrongs, the prosecutor should reveal, 
outside the hearing of the jury, what his basis is for 
believing in the rumors or incidents he proposes to 
ask about. The court should then determine whether 
there is a substantial basis for the cross-exam ina- · 
tion." C. McCormick, Evidence 569-70 (3d ed. 1984). A 
number of courts require or recommend this proce-
dure. See U.S. v. Reese, 568 F.2d 1246, 1249 (6th Cir. 
1977); U.S. v. Duke, 492 F.2d 693, 694 (5th Cir. 1974); 
U.S. v. Lewis, 482 F.2d 632, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1973); 
Exception: Character of Victim 
The second exception to the general prohibition 
against the use of character evidence is found in 
Rule 404(A)(2). It reads: "Evidence of a pertinent trait 
of character of the victim of the crime offered by an 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or 
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the 
~ victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case 
to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggres-
sor is admissible; however, in prosecutions for rape, 
gross sexual imposition, and prostitution, the excep-
tions provided by statute enacted by the General 
Assembly are applicable." As with the first excep-
tion, only opinion and reputation evidence is per-
mitted. Rule 405(a). 
Generally, two types of cases come within this ex-
ception. In homicide and assault cases, the accused 
may introduce evidence of the victim's violent char-
acter to support a claim of self-defense. This evi-
dence is offered to show that the victim was the first 
aggressor. In homicide cases, a special rule applies. 
The prosecution need not wait for the defense to of-
fer character evidence on the first aggressor issue; 
any evidence on this issue, such as the defendant's 
testimony that the victim was the first aggressor, 
triggers the prosecution's right to respond with 
evidence of the victim's nonviolent character. 
The principal problem with this rule is that it is fre-
quently misapplied. For example, in State v. Smith, 
10 Ohio App.3d 99, 101,460 N.E.2d 693,697 (1983), 
the court held that the victim's admission to the de-
fendant that he had killed a person, her personal 
knowledge of the victim's violent attacks on others, 
and her knowledge through hearsay that the deceas-
l~ ed had committed an unprovoked act of violence 
. .,... upon another were relevent to the defendant's belief 
that she was in imminent danger of death. The court 
cited Rule 404(A)(2) to support its decision. 
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Although the evidence is relevant to self-defense, 
admissibility is not governed by Rule 404. Rule 
404(A)(2) governs only the circumstantial use of char-
acter evidence and in this context involves only one 
element of a self-defense claim: the issue of who 
was the first aggressor. The theory of admissibility is 
that a victim with a violent character acts in conform-
ity with that character and this evidence is probative 
on the first aggressor issue. A second (and distinct) 
issue in a self-defense claim is whether the defen-
dant acted with an honest and reasonable belief that 
his life was in danger when he used deadly force. 
This issue does not involve the circumstantial use of 
character. Any evidence which influenced the defen-
dant's mental state, such as his belief that the victim 
had a violent character, is admissible. It was this 
issue which was involved in Smith. See also Govern-
ment of Virgin Islands v. Carino, 631 F.2d 226, 229 (3d 
Cir. 1980); C. McCormick, Evidence 572 n.3 (3d ed. 
1984) ("Used for this purpose, the evidence does not 
transgress the policy against employing character 
evidence to show conduct."). 
The second type of case in which a victim's char-
acter may be relevant is a rape or gross sexual impo-
sition prosecution. As Rule 404(A)(2) provides, admis-
sibility of character evidence in these cases is con-
trolled by the rape shield statute. RC 2907.02(D); RC 
2907.05(D). Shield laws are often attacked on consti-
tutional grounds. See Letwin, "Unchaste Character," 
Ideology, and the California Rape Evidence Laws, 54 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 35 (1980); Tanford & Bocchino, Rape 
Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 544 (1980); Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's 
Tribulations: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 39-69 (1977). 
For the most part, such attacks have failed. See 
Doe v. U.S., 666 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1981); Annat., 1 
ALR4th 283 (1980). Nevertheless, the circumstances 
of a particular case may support such an argument. 
Indeed, the federal shield law explicitly recognizes 
this possibility. See Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(1) (admissi-
bility may be "constitutionally required"). State v. 
Jalo, 27 Or. App. 845, 850-51, 557 P.2d 1359, 1362 
(1976), is illustrative. In Jalo the defendant denied 
that he had sexual intercourse with the complainant. 
The court held it was error to exclude evidence that 
the complainant had had sexual relations with the 
defendant's son and others, which facts had become 
known to the defendant and he had told the com-
plainant that he would notify her parents. Application 
of the shield law in this case precluded the defen-
dant from establishing the complainant's motive to 
falsely accuse him. 
Exception: Character of Witnesses 
The third exception to the general prohibition 
against character evidence involves the character of 
a witness. Rule 404(A)(3) contains a cross-reference 
to the impeachment rules relating to character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness. See Rule 609 (im-
peachment by prior convictions); Rule 608(A) (im-
peachment by reputation or opinion); Rule 608(B) im-
peachment by prior acts not resulting in a conviction). 
,, 
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RULE 404(B) 
As mentioned at the beginning of this article, Rule 
404(B) governs the admissibility of "other acts" evi-
dence. A close analysis of the rule is critical. The rule 
contains two sentences. The first sentence provides: 
"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not ad-
missible to prove' the character of a person in order 
to show that he acted in conformity therewith." This 
sentence is redundant. Rule 404(A) already prohibits 
the circumstantial use of character. The second sen-
tence provides that such evidence "may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of mo-
tive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, know-
ledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." 
In one sense, this sentence is unnecessary. Rule 
404(A) prohibits only the circumstantial use of 
character. If evidence is offered for some other pur-
pose, Rule 404(A) simply does not apply. The federal 
drafters, of course, were aware of this. They included 
Rule 404(b) as a rule of clarification, intending it to 
highlight the limited scope of Rule 404(a). 
Before discussing the analysis required by Rule 
404 (B), several preliminary issues deserve attention. 
Civil cases 
"Other acts" evidence is typically used in criminal 
cases, and thus it is not surprising that the Ohio Sim-
ilar Acts statute, RC 2945.59, was placed in the crimi-
nal code. Rule 404(B), however, applies in civil as 
well as criminal cases. See Doe v. New York City 
Dep't of Social Services, 649 F.2d 134, 147 (2d Cir. 
1981) (civil rights action), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 195 
(1983); Annat., 64 ALR Fed 648 (1983) (applicability of 
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) in civil cases). 
"Other acts" evidence offered by the accused 
Rule 404(b) is typically used by the prosecution. 
For instance, if the defendant employs a distinctive 
modus operandi in a series of robberies but is charg-
ed with only the last robbery, the prosecution may of-
fer evidence that the defendant committed the prior 
robberies using this distinctive modus operandi. 
Proof that the same modus operandi was used in the 
charged offense raises the inference that the defen-
dant also committed that crime. Thus, the "other 
act" evidence is· relevant to establish identity. 
The probative value of modus operandi to show 
identity, however, is the same when it is offered by 
the defense. In this context, the defense is attemp-
ting to show that another person, using a distinctive 
modus operandi, committed the earlier robberies 
and, since the same m.o. was used in the charged of-
fense, that person also committed it. See State v. 
Garfole, 76 N.J. 445, 388 A.2d 587 (1978); State v. 
Bock, 229 Minn. 449, 39 N.W.2d 887 (1949). Indeed, 
the argument for admissibility is stronger when 
"other acts" evidence is offered by the defendant 
because the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant 
is not present. See U.S. v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 
906, 911 (2d Cir. 1984) (standard of admissibility when 
other acts are offered by the defense is not as re-
strictive as in cases in which the evidence is off-ered 
by the prosecution). 
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Subsequent acts 
Although "other acts" evidence is sometimes re-
ferred to as "prior crimes" evidence, the relevant act 
may have occurred after the charged offense. In 
other words, subsequent acts may also be admissi-
ble. See U.S. v. Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1388 (8th Cir. 
1981), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 742 (1983); State v. 
Wilson, 8 Ohio App.3d 216, 219,456 N.E.2d 1287, 1291 
(1982) (evidence of subsequent unlawful importuning 
admitted in rape case). For example, if a robbery de-
fendant threatens a witness the day before trial, evi-
dence of the threat may be admissible to show con-
sciousness of guilt, even though it occurred after the 
charged offense. 
Noncriminal conduct 
By its own terms, Rule 404(B) is not limited to 
other crimes. It includes other acts and wrongs that 
are not criminal. U.S. v. Rubio-Gonzalez, 674 F.2d 
1067, 1075 (5th Cir. 1982) ("Rule 404(b) authorizes the 
admission of prior 'acts' as well as 'crimes' and 
'wrongs.'"). This is another reason why the term 
"prior crimes" evidence is misleading. As an exam-
ple, consider a murder case in which the prosecu-
tion's theory is that the defendant killed the victim 
because he wanted to marry the victim's wife. Proof 
of an affair between the defendant and the victim's 
wife-the "other act"-may be admissible to estab-
lish motive. 
Similar acts 
The "other act" need not be similar to the charged 
offense. This is why the term "Similar Acts" Statute 
is misleading. Sometimes the other act is similar. 
The robbery example mentioned above is illustrative; 
it is the existence of the similarity in the distinctive 
modus operandi in the prior offenses and the case at 
bar which makes the "other act" relevant to prove 
identity. In other cases, however, there is no similari-
ty between the "other act" and the charged offense. 
Here, the murder example mentioned above is illus-
trative. The "other act" is the affair with the victim's 
wife; the charged offense is murder. 
Statute of Limitations 
Several cases have involved the admissibility of 
evidence of prior crimes for which the statute of limi-
tations has expired. The courts·have held that this 
fact does not preclude admission of the evidence. 
U.S. v. DeFiore, 720 F.2d 757, 764 (2d Cir. 1983); U.S. v. 
Means, 695 F.2d 811,816 (5th Cir. 1983); U.S. v. 
Blosser, 440 F.2d 697,699 (10th Cir. 1971). These 
courts have found that the reasons for enacting a 
statute of limitations are inapplicable in this context: 
The statute of limitations is a defense to prosecution, 
not a rule of evidence. Therefore, once prosecution is 
timely instituted, the statute of limitations has no bear-
ing on the admissibility of evidence. It would be a bizarre 
result indeed if a crime properly prosecuted within the 
limitations period could not be proven because an es-
sential element, such as intent, could only be estab-
lished by proof of incidents occurring outside the period. 
U.S. v. Ashdown, 509 F.2d 793, 798 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
423 U.S. 529 (1975). 
Acquittals 
The federal courts are divided on the issue of 
whether a prior acquittal precludes the admission of 
"other acts" evidence. Compare U.S. v. Van Cleave, 
599 F.2d 954, 957 (10th Cir. 1979) (evidence of another 
crime is not necessarily inadmissible by the fact of 
acquittal), with Albert v. Montgomery, 732 F.2d 865, 
869-70 (11th Cir. 1984). U.S. v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 
329, 334-35 (2d Cir. 1979) (evidence of prior similar 
acts is not admissible when the defendant has been 
acquitted of those acts by a jury); U.S. v. Keller, 624 
F.2d 1154, 1157 (3d Ci r. 1980) (collateral estoppal 
precludes admission of evidence of other crimes 
following an acquittal). See generally Annot., 25 
ALR4th 934 (1983). 
The rationale for precluding the use of an "other 
act" which has resulted in an acquittal is often bas-
ed on constitutional considerations. The U.S. Su-
preme Court has ruled that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause encompasses the doctrine of collateral es-
toppel. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). Al-
though Ashe did not involve "other acts" evidence, 
some courts have extended Ashe to cover such 
evidence: 
[l]t is a basic tenet of our jurisprudence that once the 
state has mustered its evidence against a defendant and 
failed, the matter is done. In the eyes of the law the ac-
quitted defendant is to be treated as innocent and in the 
interests of fairness and finality made no more to an-
swer for his alleged crime. It is our view that the admis-
sion into a trial of evidence of crimes of which the defen-
dant has been acquitted prejudices and burdens the 
defendant in contravention of this basic principle and is 
fundamentally unfair. State v. Wakefield, 278 N.W.2d 
307, 308-9 (Minn. 1979). 
The counter argument is that the a-ccused is not be-
ing retried for the prior offense when only evidentiary 
use is made of that offense, and that double jeopar-
dy arises only when there is relitigation of the same 
facts from the same transaction: 
Offering evidence of a prior crime, for which defendant 
has been acquitted, to a jury embarked on a distinct in-
quiry ... does not involve asking the second jury to con-
vict defendant for the prior crime. It does not involve the 
second jury contradicting the first jury, since the first 
jury did not find that the defendant did not commit the 
crime, only that the People had not proved that he had 
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Oliphant, 399 
Mich. 472,498 n.14, 250 N.W.2d 443,454 (1976). 
See generally E. lmwinkelried, Uncharged Miscon-
duct Evidence§§ 10.03-.09 (1984). 
ADMISSIBILITY 
Admissibility of "other acts" evidence requires an 
analysis under Rules 401 and 403. Rule 404(8) simply 
says that evidence of "other acts" may be admissi-
ble. As Judge Weinstein has written: "Rule 404(b) 
does not authorize automatic admission." 2 J. Wein-
stein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 404-47(1982). 
~ The federal drafters also recognized that admission 
if!! was not automatic: "No mechanical solution is of-
,_ fered. The determination must be made whether the 
danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative 
value of the evidence in view of the availability of 
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other proof and other factors appropriate for making 
decisions of this kind under Rule 403." Advisory 
Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). 
Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence 
having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence." Rule 403(A) pro-
vides: "Although relevant, evidence is not admissible 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the is-
sues, or of misleading the jury." Although "other 
acts" evidence may be confusing and misleading, it 
is the risk of unfair prejudice that is the principal 
concern-in particular, the risk that the jury will 
misuse the evidence for the prohibited purpose of es-
tablishing propensity or character. 
Relevance other than propensity 
The first step in determining the admissibility of 
"other acts" evidence is identifying its relevancy or 
probative value. The evidence must prove something 
other than the defendant's propensity. While the pro-
secution will rarely admit that the evidence is being 
offered to show propensity, there are a few reported 
cases in which admissibility is argued on this basis. 
E.g., People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 172 N.E. 466 
(1930) (possession of weapons offered to show 
defendant was a "person criminally inclined"). In 
most cases, the prosecution will offer some other 
reason for admission. For example, in People v. 
Tassell, 201 Cal. Rptr. 567, 679 P.2d 1 (1984), the 
defendant claimed that the victim consented to an 
act of oral copulation. In its case-in-chief, the pro-
secution introduced two prior sex offenses commit-
ted in much the same way. According to the prosecu-
tion, the evidence was offered to show a "common 
plan or design." The "common plan or design" argu-
ment might have been relevant if the defendant's 
identity or even perhaps intent to have intercourse 
were at issue. The defendant, however, claimed con-
sent, thus conceding identity and intent. According-
ly, the California Supreme Court commented that the 
"common plan or design" rationale was "merely a 
euphemism for 'disposition' " and held the evidence 
inadmissible. /d. at 574, 679 P.2d 8. 
Another common example involves the use of 
modus operandi to prove identity. Two bank rob-
beries with a firearm do not establish a distinctive 
modus operandi. As McCormick points out: "Much 
more is demanded than the mere repeated commis-
sion of crimes of the same class, such as repeated 
murders, robberies or rapes. The pattern and charac-
teristics of the crimes must be so unusual and dis-
tinctive as to be like a signature." C. McCormick, Evi-
dence 559-60 (3d ed. 1984). One court explained it 
this way: "It is apparent that the indicated inference 
does not arise ... from the mere fact that the charg-
ed and uncharged offenses share certain marks of 
similarity, for it may be that the marks in question 
are of such common occurrence that they are shared 
not only by the charged crime and defendant's prior 
offenses, but also by numerous other crimes com-
mitted by persons other than defendant." People v. 
Haston, 69 Cal.2d 233, 245, 70 Cal. Rptr. 419, 427, 444 
P.2d 91, 99 (1968). 
To avoid these traps the prose<:;ution should bear 
the burden of clearly stating the relevance of "other 
acts" evidence. As one court has commented, "the 
prosecutor's first duty is to identify, with specificity, 
the purpose for which the evidence is admissible" 
and the trial court should require "a showing by the 
prosecutor as to how such evidence is relevant .... " 
People v. Golochowicz, 413 Mich. 298, 314-15, 319 
N.W.2d 518, 523-24 (1982). Any other approach will re-
sult in what one commentator has described as the 
"smorgasbord" approach to analysis of other crimes 
evidence "in which the court simply serves up a long 
list of permissible uses without any attempt to show 
how any of them are applicable to the case at hand." 
22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure 479 (1978). 
Relevancy-"other purposes" 
Rule 404(B) lists a number of purposes for which 
"other acts" evidence may be admitted: motive, op-
portunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, iden-
tity, or absence of mistake or accident. Two points 
are worth noting about this list. First, the list is not 
exhaustive. See State v. Wilson, 8 Ohio App.3d 216, 
219, 456 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (1982) ("a party may some-
times introduce 'other acts' evidence, although the 
purpose for its admission is not enumerated in Evid 
R 404(B)"). 
Second and more importantly, the list may be 
more harmful than helpful. Many of the "purposes" 
listed, such as motive, opportunity, and preparation, 
are not essential elements of crimes. Accordingly, it 
is not enough for the prosecution to state that the 
"other acts" evidence is being offered to prove mo-
tive; the prosecution must state that motive is rele-
vant to some essential element, such as identity. 
This point is critical because, as will be discussed in 
a subsequent section, identity may not be a disputed 
issue in the case, and thus the need for the evidence 
may be minimal while the risk of unfair prejudice 
may be substantial. 
One helpful commentary states that "other acts" 
evidence is generally admissible on three different 
ultimate issues: identity, mens rea, and corpus delic-
ti. 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and 
Procedure 460 (1978). 
"Other acts" evidence is often used to show that 
the accused was the actor, i.e. to establish identity. 
Several of the listed "purposes" of Rule 404(B) fall in-
to this category. For example: (1) In a murder case, 
evidence of the defendant's affair with the victim's 
wife (the "other act") may be admitted to establish 
motive and motive is probative of identity. (2) In a 
murder case in which the victim was killed by ttie ex-
plosion of a bomb, evidence that the defendant had 
used a bomb in a prior offense may be admissible to 
establish the defendant's technical know-how with 
explosives, and this capacity (opportunity) is proba-
tive of identity. (3) In a bank robbery case, evidence 
that the defendant had previously stolen the car that 
was later identified as the robbery getaway car may 
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be admissible to establish preparation and is proba-
tive of identity. 
"Other acts" evidence is often used to show that 
the accused possessed the requisite mental state fo 
the charged offense, i.e. to establish the mens rea. 
Two of the listed "purposes"-intent and knowledgE 
-are typical mens rea elements. Moreover, absence 
of mistake or accident relates to mens rea. It is simp 
ly a claim that the defendant did not possess the 
necessary mens rea. For example, when the defen-
dant claims he made a mistake about the nature of a 
controlled substance, he is asserting that he did not 
have the requisite mens rea, i.e. knowledge that the 
substance was heroin. Accordingly, his prior heroin 
transactions may be admissible to show that he is 
familiar with heroin and thus a mistake is unlikely. 
Although not as common as the identity and mem 
rea examples, "other acts" evidence may be used to 
show that a crime has been committed, i.e. to estab-
lish the corpus delicti. The famous "Brides in the 
Bath Case," Rex v. Smith, 11 Grim. App. 229, 84 
L.J.K.B. 2153 (1915), illustrates this use of "other 
acts" evidence. In that case, the defendant was ac-
cused of murdering his wife, who was found drown-
ed in a bath tub. The prosecution introduced evi-
dence showing that two other women who had been 
married to the defendant also drowned while taking 
baths. The evidence was relevant to show that the 
death in the charged offense was homicidal and not 
accidental. See also U.S. v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th 
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (197 4). 
In addition to identity, mens rea, and corpus de-
licti, there is another category of cases in which 
"other acts" evidence is often found. This category 
is sometimes labeled "interrelated acts" or "res 
gestae." In State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 330 
N.E.2d 720 (1975), the Supreme Court recognized tha 
there are: 
Situations in which the "other acts" form part of the im-
mediate background of the alleged act which forms the 
foundation of the crime charged in the indictment. In 
such cases, it would be virtually impossible to prove tha 
the accused committed the crime charged without also 
introducing evidence of the other acts. To be admissible 
... the "other acts" testimony must concern events 
which are inextricably related to the alleged criminal ac· 
.... /d. at 73, 330 N.E.2d at 725. 
There is some dispute, at ieast in the federal 
cases, over whether "interrelated acts" are "other 
acts" within the meaning of Federal Rule 404(b). For 
example, in U.S. v. Weeks, 716 F.2d 830, 832 (11th Cir 
1983), the Eleventh Circuit took the position that evi-
dence of criminal activity other than the charged of-
fense is not considered extrinsic evidence within thE 
proscription of Rule 404(b): (1) if it is an uncharged o1 
tense which arose out of the same transaction or 
series of transactions as the charged offense, (2) if it 
was inextricably intertwined with the evidence regar· 
ding the charged offense, or (3) if it is necessary to 
complete the story of the crime charged. In contrast, 
the Second Circuit in U.S. v. Levy, 731 F.2d 997, 1003 
(2d Cir. 1984), held that Rules 404(b) and 403 govern 
the admissibility of evidence of uncharged crimes 
that are inextricably interwoven with the charged of-
fense. 
Under either view, the critical issue remains the 
same: "[O]nly as much of related crimes as is neces-
! (~ sary to r.nake comprehensible the evidence relating 
to the charged crime should be admitted." 2 J. 
Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 404-61 
to 62 (1982). 
Relevancy-the defendant's involvement in the 
"other act" 
In order to establish the relevancy of "other acts" 
evidence, the prosecution must also show that the 
defendant committed the other act. In the distinctive 
modus operandi example used earlier in this article, 
evidence of the prior robberies is not relevant, no 
matter how similar they are to the charged offense, 
unless it can be shown that the defendant was in-
volved in the prior robberies. The defendant's involve-
ment need not have resulted in a conviction nor does 
the prosecution have to establish his involvement by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Ohio cases require substantial proof that the 
defendant committed the other act. State v. Dick, 27 
Ohio St.2d 162, 167-68,271 N.E.2d 797, 800-01 (1971); 
State v. Carter, 26 Ohio St.2d 79, 82-83, 269 N.E.2d 
115, 117 (1971). Most federal courts require clear and 
convincing evidence. U.S. v. Gustafson, 728 F.2d 
1078, 1082-83 (8th Cir. 1984); U.S. v. Kane, 726 F.2d 
344, 348 (7th Cir. 1984). But see U.S. v. Beechum, 582 
F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 920 
(1979). See generally Sharpe, Two-Step Balancing 
and the Admissibility of Other Crimes Evidence: A 
Sliding Scale of Proof, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 556 
(1984). 
Balancing probative value against unfair prejudice 
Once the relevance of "other acts" evidence is 
established, the trial court must weigh its probative 
value against the danger of unfair prejudice. Under 
Ohio Rule 403(A), the evidence must be excluded if 
the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs probative 
value. The latest edition of McCormick's text de-
scribes this process in the following way: 
In deciding whether the danger of unfair prejudice and 
the like substantially outweighs the incremental proba-
tive value, a variety of matters must be considered, in-
cluding the strength of the evidence as to the commis-
sion of the other crime, the similarities between the 
crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the 
crimes, the need tor the evidence, the efficacy of alter-
native proof, and the degree to which the evidence pro-
bably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility. C. 
McCormick, Evidence 565 (3d ed. 1984). 
Several courts require that this "balancing" pro-
cess be reflected in the record. See U.S. v. Robinson, 
700 F.2d 205, 213 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 
S.Ct. 1003 (1984) (Rule 404(b) requires the trial court 
to make an on-the-record articulation of probative 
(~ ~~~~~ _v~~~uk~~,r~h~d ~~~dw5~~~ ~~ci un~~~~~gy C~ r~~~~b;) 
(the trial judge must ensure that the record reflects 
the consideration he made in balancing the proba-
tive value of evidence of bad acts against their preju-
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dicial impact). 
One aspect of this "balancing"process deserves 
special attention. Because "other acts" evidence 
commonly involves the risk of unfair prejudice, many 
courts have ruled that such evidence is admissible 
only if the issue for which it is offered is in dispute. 
For example, the Second Circuit has stated that 
"other acts" evidence is "inadmissible to prove in-
tent when that issue is not really in dispute." U.S. v. 
Williams, 577 F.2d 188, 191 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 868 (1978). See also C. McCormick, Evidence 564 
(3d ed. 1984) (there should be "a genuine controversy"). 
Several Ohio cases contain comparable language. 
In State v. Eubank, 60 Ohio St.2d 183, 398 N.E.2d 567 
(1979), the state argued the admissibility of evidence 
of "other acts" on the theory that such evidence 
showed an absence of mistake or accident. The Su-
preme Court held admission was error because 
"[m]istake or accident was not a material issue." /d. 
at 186, 398 N.E.2d at 569. See also State v. Curry, 43 
Ohio St.2d 66, 73, 330 N.E.2d 720, 726 (1975) ("In the 
present appeal, identity was not a material issue."). 
Frequently, a stipulation will eliminate an issue 
from dispute and thus preclude the need for "other 
acts" evidence. See U.S. v. Mohel, 604 F.2d 748 (2d 
Cir. 1979); U.S. v. De Vaughn, 601 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1979). 
In order to ensure that "other acts" evidence is of-
fered on a disputed issue, the Second Circuit has 
provided some additional guidelines. If the evidence 
is offered to prove that the defendant committed the 
act charged, for example, by proving identity, the 
"other acts" evidence may be offered during the pro-
secution's case-in-chief, unless the defendant's com-
mission of the act is not a disputed issue. If the evi-
dence is offered to prove the defendant's intent or 
knowledge, the offer of similar acts evidence should 
await the conclusion of the defendant's case and 
should be aimed at a specifically identified issue. 
U.S. v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934,939 (2d Cir. 1980). The 
court recognized that this approach might deprive 
the prosecution of necessary evidence in some 
cases. Accordingly, the court suggested that the pro-
secution should rest its case, "reserving, out of the 
presence of the jury, the right to reopen to present 
such evidence in the event the defendants rest with-
out introducing evidence." /d. at 939 n.l. 
In contrast, other courts permit the prosecution 
greater leeway. For example, in U.S. v. Miller, 725 
F.2d 462, 466 (8th Cir. 1984), the Eight Circuit held 
that where intent is an element of the crime charged, 
evidence of other acts tending to establish that ele-
ment is generally admissible. The prosecution need 
not await the defendant's denial of intent before of-
fering evidence of similar acts. This view unneces-
sarily opens the door to the admission of "other 
acts" evidence. As one court has commented: "The 
mere theory that a plea of not guilty puts everything 
material in issue is not enough .... The prosecution 
cannot credit the accused with fancy defences in 
order to rebut them at the outset with some damning 
piece of prejudice." Thompson v. The King, 1918 
App. C. 221, 232. 
·I' :.: 
'! 
Notice 
Because of the prejudice associated with "other 
acts" evidence, several courts have recommended 
that the prosecution give advanced notice when it in-
tends to introduce evidence of "other acts." U.S. v. 
Foskey, 636 F.2d 517,526 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Florida 
Rule 404 requires written notice to defense. See also 
Burks v. State, 594 P.2d 771, 774-75 (Okla. Grim. App. 
1979) (ten-day pretrial written notice to defense 
describing other acts with particularity; notice not re-
quired where the other acts resulted in a conviction 
or is part of the res gestae); State v. Gray, 640 P.2d. 
233, 236 (Mont. 1982) (prosecution must prov1de wnt-
ten notice, including a statement of purpose for 
which "other acts" evidence will be offered). 
The rationale for notice is clear: "The major tac-
tical advantage accruing to the prosecution is sur-
prise since there is no requirement that the other 
crime be alleged in the pleadings and often the ex-
istence of such evidence cannot be determined 
through the limited discovery available in criminal 
cases." 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice 
and Procedure 525 (1978). 
Jury Instructions 
It may be possible to avoid the prejudicial effect of 
"other acts" evidence through the use of instruc-
tions that inform the jury that such evidence may not 
be used to show the defendant's character. See 1 E. 
Devitt &C. Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and In-
structions§§ 14.14 & .15 (3d ed. 1977); 4 Ohio Jury 
Instructions 402.61 (1984). 
The effectiveness of such an instruction, however, 
has been questioned. As one commentator has noted: 
"It may not be ... realistic to believe that evidence 
which would be seriously prejudicial can be made 
substantially less so by asking the jury to use the evi-
dence only for proof of an element of the crime and 
not as direct proof that the defendant committed the 
crime." Note Rule, 404(b) Other Crimes Evidence: The 
Need tor a Two-Step Analysis, 71 Nw. U. L. Rev. 635, 
643 (1977). Indeed, the instruction may be more harm-
ful than helpful if it unduly emphasizes the evidence. 
See United States v. Barnes, 586 F.2d 1052, 1059 (5th 
Cir. 1978) ("Counsel may refrain from requesting an 
instruction in order not to emphasize potentially 
damaging evidence .... "). Perhaps because of these 
reasons, the trial court is not required to instruct on 
"other acts" evidence sua sponte. The defense coun-
sel must request an instruction. See United States v. 
Murzyn, 631 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
450 U.S. 923 (1981); United States v. Potter, 616 F.2d 
384, 389 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 832 
(1980). If an instruction is considered desirable, coun-
sel should request that it be given twice-once when 
the evidence is admitted and later when the case is 
submitted to the jury. 
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CONCLUSION 
As a recent review of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence has commented, "The use of other crimes, 
acts and conduct to prove matters other than general 
character has always been problematic for courts." 
ABA Section on Litigation, Emerging Problems Un-
der the Federal Rules of Evidence 65 (1983). Un-
fortunately, the federal drafters did not do more to 
eliminate some of the problems. Thus, the courts are 
now left with the responsibility of providing guidance 
for the admissibility of "other acts" evidence under 
Rule 404. Such guidance is solely needed; otherwise, 
the shot-gun approach to this type of evidence may 
continue. 
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RECENT BOOKS 
Several texts on criminal law, criminal procedure, 
and evidence have been published recently. These 
texts should be of interest to criminal litigators. Pro-
fessor Lewis Katz has written a book entitled Ohio 
Arrest, Search and Seizure, published by Banks Bald-
win. In addition to chapters on Fourth Amendment 
law it contains chapters on confessions and lineups. 
Professors LaFave and Israel have published a three-
volume work, entitled Criminal Procedure. This work 
covers all aspects of criminal procedure, including 
chapters on search and seizure, confessions, line-
ups, grand jury practice, pretrial release, severance 
and joinder, speedy trial, discovery, and so forth. 
Another book, Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses, 
treats criminal defenses, including chapters on in-
sanity, mistake, self-defense, and so forth. In addi-
tion the third edition of McCormick, Evidence has rec~ntly been published. All three books are publish-
ed by the West Publishing Company. A fourth book, 
lmwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, is 
published by Callaghan & Company. 
